跳至內容

用戶:Hnlyyyy/沙盒

維基百科，自由的百科全書
關於the intervention since 2015，請見「Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war」。
A grey world map with Russia and Syria highlighted
Russia (green) and Syria (orange)

Template:Campaignbox Foreign involvement in the Syrian Civil War Template:History of Russia

Russia has supported the administration of incumbent President Bashar al-Assad of Syria since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in 2011: politically, with military aid, and (since September 2015) with direct military involvement. The 2015 deployment to Syria marked the first time since the end of the Cold War in 1991 that Russia entered an armed conflict outside the borders of the former Soviet Union.[1]

From October 2011, Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, repeatedly vetoed Western-sponsored draft resolutions in the UN Security Council that demanded the resignation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and would thereby open the possibility of United Nations sanctions against his government.[2][3] The Russian leadership rejects the demands of Western powers and their Arab allies that Bashar al-Assad should not be allowed to be a participant in the Syria settlement.[4][5][6] In January and February 2012, the opposition Syrian National Council[7] and the Western powers[8] dismissed Russian peace initiatives.

In September 2015 the Federation Council, (the upper house of Russia's parliament) authorized the Russian president to use armed forces in Syria.[9] Russian air and missile strikes began targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Army of Conquest, al-Nusra Front, and the Free Syrian Army.[6][10] Russia has also provided armament and air support to Turkey. Russian military delivered 5 tons of ammunition and weapons to the People's Defense Units (part of the Syrian Democratic Forces) in Sheikh Maqsoud in their operations against ISIL in Syria.[11][12]

During the course of the Russian intervention, Russia moved beyond bombing just military targets and began bombing hospitals and medical facilities.[13] According to Airwars, between four and six thousand civilians were killed by the Russian Military actions.[14][15] Due to this, Russia's seat at the UN Human Rights Council was taken away in October 2016.[16] A report by Airwars found a 34% increase in incidents of civilian harm caused by Russia during the first six months of 2018 compared to 2017.[15]

Background

[編輯]

History of ties between Syria and Russia

[編輯]
主條目：Russia–Syria relations
Dmitry Medvedev in a joint press conference with the Syrian President following Russo-Syrian talks in May 2010

During the Cold War (1947–1991), Syria was an ally to the Soviet Union in opposition to the Western powers, and a strong political bond grew.[17] Between 1955 and 1958, Syria received about $294 million from the Soviet Union for military and economic assistance.[18] The Suez War in 1956 accelerated a multiplication of ties between Syria and the Soviet Union, simultaneously with the increase in power and influence of the Syrian Ba'ath Party.[19]

The Syrian Revolution of February 1966 gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to further support Syria. In 1971, under an agreement with the Syrian Ba'athist government's President Hafez al-Assad, the Soviet Union was allowed to open its naval military base in Tartus, giving the Soviet Union a stable presence in the Middle East.[20][21] Thousands of Syrian military officers and educated professionals studied in Russia during President Hafez al-Assad's three-decade rule (1971–2000).[22]

In April 1977, Hafez al-Assad visited Moscow, and met with Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin among others, as a sign of improved Syrian relations with the USSR. Three years later, in October 1980, Syria and the Soviet Union signed a twenty-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.[23]

At the beginning of the Syrian civil war (2011), Syria was one of Russia's closest Middle Eastern allies.

Syrian civil war

[編輯]
參見：Syrian civil war和Vetoed United Nations Security Council resolutions on Syria
Bashar al-Assad, Syrian President since 2000

The Syrian Civil War is an ongoing international armed conflict taking place in Syria.[24] The unrest began in the early spring of 2011 within the context of Arab Spring protests, with nationwide protests against President Bashar al-Assad's government, whose forces responded with violent crackdowns. The civil uprising phase created the platform for the emergence of militant opposition movements and massive defections from the Syrian Army, which gradually transformed the conflict from a civil uprising to an armed rebellion, and later civil war. The rebel Free Syrian Army was created on 29 July 2011 and from then on, the struggle took the shape of an armed insurgency, with civil resistance disbanded and opposition members turning to arms. Many factions arose, either as break-offs of the Free Syrian Army or spontaneously in their own rights.[25]

The killing of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya reportedly left a particularly strong and consequential impression on Putin. A senior diplomat who had served at the U.S. embassy in Moscow under the Obama administration reportedly claimed that "Putin had been appalled by Gaddafi's fate"[26] to the extent that "Putin had watched a video of Gaddafi's savage death three times, a video that shows him being sodomised with a bayonet."[26] Referring to the U.S. coalition's lobbying efforts for the airstrikes at the United Nations, the U.S. diplomat was quoted as saying that a later U.S. intelligence assessment concluded that "Putin blamed himself for letting Gaddafi go, for not playing a strong role behind the scenes" and that the video may have even influenced Putin's decision to support Syrian president Bashar al-Assad since "Putin believed that unless he got engaged Bashar would suffer the same fate – mutilated – and he'd see the destruction of his allies in Syria."[26]

By 2012 it was reported the U.S. was running a covert operation in aid of militant groups fighting the Assad government.[27][28]

On 6 March 2013, the Arab League gave its members the green light to arm the Syrian rebels.[29] On 26 March 2013, at the Arab league summit in Doha, the League recognised the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, as the legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.[30]

Since 2014, a significant part of Syria's territory had been claimed by Islamic State (ISIL), an entity internationally recognised as a terrorist organization; a number of Western and other countries, most notably the U.S., Britain and France, began to participate in direct military action against ISIL in the territory of Syria.

Presumed motives

[編輯]

Military facilities

[編輯]
更多資訊：Russia–Syria relations § Russian naval base Tartus和Russian naval facility in Tartus

The Russian naval facility in Tartus in Syria is Russia's only naval facility in the Mediterranean region and only remaining military facility outside the former USSR. In March 2012, critics saw the position of the naval facility in Tartus as a chief motivating factor for Russia to speak out in favor of the Assad government maintaining stability in the region.[需要解釋][31][32]

Russian jihadists in Syria

[編輯]
更多資訊：Foreign rebel fighters in the Syrian Civil War § Chechnya and Russia

At least since mid 2013, Chechen and other Russian North Caucasus volunteers have been fighting in the Syrian Civil War against the government of Bashar al-Assad.[33] The Washington Post in 2014 reported that Moscow was concerned about such fighters returning to Russia after having picked up militant contacts in Syria.[34]

As of September 2015, an estimated 2,500 Russian nationals were fighting alongside ISIL,[35] and President Putin declared that their return to Russia would be a threat to Russia, and that it would be better to fight them on Syrian ground.[36]

Economic importance and history of arms sales

[編輯]
更多資訊：Russia–Syria relations § Economic relations

Russia has been able to showcase its old and new weapons in the conflict which helped boost its arms sales to $15bn in 2015.[37][38]

Russian economic interests in Syria, including arms sales, are offered as one of the reasons for its support of the government. However, according to Foreign Affairs, economic considerations are of less importance than geopolitical ones.[17] This is especially due to the fact that many Syrian arms purchases are financed by loans.[39]

Casualties

[編輯]
主條目：Russian Armed Forces casualties in Syria

Many Russian soldiers have died during the war. Russian officials estimate that as of January 2019, 112 soldiers have been killed since troops were sent to fight in Syria in 2015. The BBC has a higher estimation of 175 deaths having occurred from 2015 to the end of 2018.[來源請求]

In 2019, the Russian Armed Forces were accused of covering up the death one of its soldiers, junior sergeant Andranik Arustamyan. However, Arustamyan's family has defended the military and said that they were informed of his death.[40]

Political efforts and statements

[編輯]

2011

[編輯]

At the end of May 2011, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia opposed United Nations' involvement in Syria because "the situation doesn't present a threat to international peace and security ... Syria is a very important country in the Middle East and destabilizing Syria would have repercussions far beyond its borders", and asserted that Assad had made attempts at major reform.[41]

In June, both the US and other Western governments[42] as well as Syrian protesters[43] prevailed upon Russia to change its position, and finally a Syrian anti-government delegation visited Moscow and met with Russian envoy Mikhail Margelov, who after the meeting noted that "leaders come and go" and called for "an end to any and all forms of violence", which some interpreted to be a shift away from Assad, once a major ally, in foreign policy.[44] "A harder line from Russia would be a blow to Syria which relies heavily on Russian military equipment and has long-standing ties to Moscow", the American nbcnews.com wrote that day.[44]

On 19 July, Russian Prime minister, Dmitri Medvedev said he was working with German Chancellor Angela Merkel to find consensus for a strategy to persuade the Syrian government to abandon violence and begin a constructive dialogue with protesters. He did not threaten to use Russia's veto at the United Nations Security Council to oppose a resolution critical of the Syrian government, as Russia has previously said it could do. Medvedev also said it was imperative that Syria not slide into civil war the way Libya did in 2011.[45]

Amid the siege of Hama, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 1 August documenting deaths in Hama as well as condemning the violence, including the alleged killing of eight policemen by Assad's government. The statement beseeched the pro-Assad forces as well as the violent protesters to "exercise maximum restraint".[46]

On 3 August, Russian UN ambassador Vitaly Churkin stated that Russia will not oppose a UN resolution condemning the violence in Syria as long as it does not include sanctions or other "pressures".[47] Al Jazeera reported that Russia had "softened the blow" to the Assad government by insisting successfully that the UN would make a statement rather than a resolution on the matter.[48] On 23 August, the Russian delegation to the UN, along with those of China and Cuba, took to the floor to denounce a UN inquiry into human rights violations by the Assad government.[49] Vitaly Churkin stated that "We hope to see progress, we hope to see dialogue established in Syria. ... We think we should continue to work within the scope of that unified position."[50]

On 26 August, Reuters reported that according to UN envoys, the effort by the US, France, the UK, Germany and Portugal to impose UN sanctions on Syria was meeting "fierce resistance" from Russia and China, with Vitaly Churkin threatening to use Russia's veto power.[51] According to Reuters, the arms embargo included in the sanctions would prevent Russian firms (the main source of Syrian weaponry) from selling to Syria.[51] Russia proposed a second "rival" resolution to be voted on, described as "toothless" by Western diplomats, which did not include sanctions or other punitive measures, but rather urged Syria to speed up the process of its reforms.[51]

On 4 October, Russia and China exercised a double veto against a Western-drafted Security Council resolution.[32] The resolution demanded an end to all violence in Syria, accountability for those responsible for it, condemned "grave and systematic" human rights violations, called for a political process, encouraged the opposition to take part in that, and said the Security Council would review Syria's compliance with the resolution in 30 days after which the council would "consider options", including unspecified "measures" under the United Nations Charter.[52][53][54] The New York Times qualified that as "a weak reference to the possibility of sanctions against Damascus", while Russia had said it would not accept a resolution that included even a hint of sanctions. Russia and the other BRICS nations (Brazil, India, China, South Africa) argued that a UNSC resolution on Libya had been twisted to justify the NATO 2011 military intervention in Libya leading into war against the Libyan government and were determined not to repeat that.[52][54] After this veto, an analyst of the Center for the Analysis of Middle East Conflicts said to the BBC Russian service: Assad has a better chance to resist than the opposition does to win, therefore Moscow is now simply betting on Assad.[53]

In the days following their rejecting the Security Council resolution, both Russia and China issued public admonishments of the Syrian government, separately expressing their desire for the government to reform and respect the will of the Syrian people. "If the Syrian leadership is unable to complete such reforms, it will have to go, but this decision should be made not by NATO and certain European countries, it should be made by the people of Syria and the government of Syria," Medvedev told the Russian Security Council.[55]

On 1 November, Sergei Lavrov said at a Russian-Gulf ministerial meeting that Russia would oppose the recent proposal for a no-fly zone in Syria as (in Russia's view) the no-fly zone in Libya had been used to "support one side in a civil war". Lavrov nonetheless stated, when asked if Russia was supporting the Assad government, that "we are not protecting any regime".[54]

On 15 December, Russia proposed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the violence "by all parties, including disproportionate use of force by Syrian authorities". The draft resolution also raised concern over "the illegal supply of weapons to the armed groups in Syria". Western diplomats initially referred to the proposed resolution as a basis for negotiations.[56] The proposal was an updated version of a Russian-Chinese draft resolution introduced to the Security Council a few months earlier.[56]

2012

[編輯]

By the end of January 2012, a resolution proposal, competing with the Russian 15 December draft (see above), had been drafted by Western and Arab powers, which, in contrast, did not condemn violence by both sides in the conflict and did not rule out military intervention. Russia indicated that it would not agree to the Western-Arab draft in its current form,[3] and that it would continue to promote its own resolution in the Security Council.[57] On 4 February 2012, Russia and China vetoed that Western and Arab sponsored Security Council resolution, which urged Bashar al-Assad to adhere to a peace plan drafted by the Arab League.[31][32][58]

On 7 February 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with foreign intelligence chief Mikhail Fradkov, met with President Assad and reported to the world that President Assad was committed to reform of the constitution and electoral process. Additionally, the Russian delegation said that Syria alone held the power to change the fate of its people, without foreign intervention.[31] In March, Lavrov said in a televised interview that Syria's leadership had ignored Russia's warnings and made "very many mistakes" that helped drag the country to the brink of civil war.[59]

On 16 April, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and other Russian diplomats met with members of the Syrian opposition and Hassan Abdul-Azim, head of an opposition group, the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change.[60] When special U.N. envoy Kofi Annan developed a plan to end Syrian violence, Russia attempted to play a major role in the outcome of the plan by meeting with both the Assad government and opposition forces, while vetoing multiple plans during Security Council votes to accomplish the goals set forth by an international consensus.

On 20 April, the Security Council announced an agreement to expand the number of U.N. cease-fire observers in Syria from 30 to 300, as well as to allow Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to decide on the peacekeepers' deployment based on conditions on the ground.[61] Under the plan, Syrian violence would immediately stop and the Assad government would begin implementation of the Annan six-point peace plan.[61] The draft was the result of two texts proposed by Russia and European Council members.[61] When the texts were merged, the portion imposing sanctions on the Assad government for failure to comply with the peacekeeping plan was removed, as requested by Russia and China.[61] The Russian draft also did not contain language dictating that U.N. peacekeepers' presence in Syria was a condition of Assad's agreement to return troops and heavy weapons to their barracks.[61]

The United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) was passed by the U.N. Security Council on 21 April 2012, and deployed up to 300 unarmed observers to Syria for a period of up to 90 days. The plan also called for passage of the Annan peace plan, making unanimous passage of the resolution significant. After the peace plan was passed, Russian's U.N. ambassador Vitaly Churkin relayed Russia's support of the agreement to the media, while other nations expressed frustration with the process and lack of progress in ending the violence so far.[62]

A Bloomberg article (April 2012) said that although Russia has tried to retain the image of a peacemaker in this conflict, Russian diplomats have repeatedly criticized the potential condemnation of Assad by western nations. Russia has also accused the West and allied nations of sabotaging a cease-fire brokered by Russia between Syrian forces.[63]

In the aftermath of the Houla massacre (May 2012), Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that "The government bears the main responsibility for what is going on" and that "Any government in any country bears responsibility for the security of its citizens".[64] Russia's reaction was considered to be a condemnation of the Syrian government.[65] However, Lavrov also stated that the rebels shared the blame for the killings, noting that some victims had been killed at close range in a district controlled by the opposition fighters.[66] As talk of UN intervention intensified, a foreign affairs committee chair in the Russian government, hardened Russia's stance, moving it further away from the earlier condemnation of Damascus, saying that "We have very strong doubts that those people who were shot at point-blank [range] and were stabbed, that this was the action of forces loyal to President Assad. ... The shelling was probably ... the troops of Mr Assad, but the stabbing and point-blank firing was definitely from the other side."[67]

According to Steve Rosenberg of the BBC in June 2012, Russia accused the US of setting double standards: US selling weapons to Bahrain and at the same time criticizing Russia for supporting Syrian President Assad with weapons. Russia feels that the US is acting hypocritically by expecting them to discontinue selling weapons to the Syrian government, since the US supplies Syrian rebels with weapons via Turkey. From Russia's perspective, if US aids the Syrian opposition, they are indirectly, undermining Russia's national security. BBC commented that Russia expects only one of two outcomes to take place in the Syrian civil war: either Assad stays in power, ensuring their stronghold influence in the middle east region, or, radical Islamists take over, creating a terror threat for Russia.[68]

2013

[編輯]

On 11 June 2013, President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that President Assad's not undertaking any "reform" had led to the current situation in Syria. He stated on Russian state media that: "Syria as a country was rife for some kind of change. And the government of Syria should have felt that in due time and should have undertaken some reform. Had they done that, what we're seeing in Syria today would have never happened."[69]

On 26 June 2013, the Deputy Russian Foreign Minister said that the small Russian naval base at Tartus has been evacuated. Mikhail Bogdanov stated that: "Presently, the Russian Defense Ministry has not a single person stationed in Syria. The base does not have any strategic military importance".[70]

On 9 September 2013, responding to U.S. threats of strikes against Syria in response to use of chemical weapons in Syria, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov issued a proposal intended to avert a U.S. attack, with provisions including Syria's placing its chemical weapons under international control and their subsequent destruction.[71]

On 12 September 2013, The New York Times published an op-ed by Vladimir Putin urging the United States to avoid unilateral military action and work with international cooperation in support of a negotiated solution to the Syrian conflict.[72]

2015

[編輯]

September

[編輯]

On 15 September 2015, in Dushanbe at a meeting of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Putin called for a united, international effort together with Syria to fight the threat of ISIL[73] but also said that Syrian President Assad "is ready to integrate the same [healthy] part of the opposition into the state's administration".[74][75]

On 27 September, President Vladimir Putin stated, in an interview with CBS's '60 Minutes': "More than 2,000 terrorist-fighters from Russia and ex-Soviet republics are in the territory of Syria. There is a threat of their return to us. So, instead of waiting for their return, we are helping President al-Assad fight them".[36]

In the United Nations General Assembly, 28 September 2015, President Putin seemed to lay at least part of the responsibility for the Syrian Civil War with unnamed powers that had been "pushing" for "democratic revolution" in Syria:

... We all know that after the end of the Cold War, a single center of domination emerged in the world. ...

... We are all different. And we should respect that. No one has to conform to a single development model that someone has once and for all recognized as the only right one.

... Attempts to push for changes within other countries based on ideological preferences often led to tragic consequences and to degradation rather than progress. It seems however, that far from learning from others' mistakes, everyone just keeps repeating them. And so the export of revolutions, this time of so-called "democratic" ones, continues. Suffice it to look at the situation in the Middle East and North Africa. ... Instead of the triumph of democracy and progress we got violence, poverty and a social disaster. ... It is now obvious that the power vacuum created in some countries of the Middle East and North Africa led to emergence of anarchy areas. Those immediately started to be filled with extremists and terrorists. Tens of thousands of militants are fighting under the banners of the so-called "Islamic State". ... And now the ranks of radicals are being joined by the members of the so-called "moderate" Syrian opposition supported by the Western countries. First, they are armed and trained, and then they defect to the Islamic State.

... Russia has always been firm and consistent in opposing terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military and technical assistance both to Iraq and Syria that are fighting terrorist groups. We think it is an enormous mistake to refuse to cooperate with the Syrian government and its Armed Forces ... We should finally acknowledge that no one but President Assad's Armed Forces and Kurd militia are truly fighting the Islamic State and other terrorist organizations in Syria. ...[4]

Russian and U.S. representatives meet to discuss the situation in Syria on 29 September 2015

Putin again called for cooperation with the Syrian government in fighting terrorism: "we should acknowledge that no-one except for Assad and his militia are truly fighting Isis in Syria."[5]

October

[編輯]

On 1 October 2015, President Vladimir Putin dismissed unidentified media reports of alleged casualties among civilians caused by Russian airstrikes in Syria as "information warfare" against Russia, stating that the claims had begun before the planes used in the airstrikes had even taken off.[來源請求]

On 12 October, Putin appealed to members of the American-led intervention in Syria to join the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War, highlighting the legality of Russia's intervention at Syria's request and questioning whether the U.S. one was valid at all. He highlighted the legitimate authority of Syria's fledgling constitutional democracy and lambasted the scrapped Pentagon program funding rebel training in Syria, saying "It would have been better to give us $500 million. At least we would have used it more effectively from the point of view of fighting international terrorism."[76]

On 13 October, Putin criticized the leaders of the American-led intervention in Syria for sending arms to the area that could end up in the wrong hands. He also criticized the American decision not to share with Russia information regarding potential ISIL targets, adding that American side does not seem to have a clear understanding of what really happens in the country and what goals they are seeking to achieve.[77][78][79]

In mid-October, Russian prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, talking of the U.S. government's refusal to engage in dialogue with Russia on cooperation in Syria, called this a "silly behavior": "As a result of these decisions and the cancellation of talks, the Americans have demonstrated their weakness." He added Russia remained open to discussion of "any issues".[80]

Russian peace initiatives and efforts

[編輯]
參見：Syrian Civil War peace process和U.S.–Russia peace proposals on Syria

On 30 January 2012, the Russian foreign ministry suggested "informal" talks in Moscow between the Syrian regime and opposition, and said the Syrian authorities had already agreed to the Russian offer. Abdel Baset Seda, a member of the Syrian National Council's executive committee, told Reuters that the SNC had not received any formal invitation for such talks, but would decline if one arrived: "Our position has not changed and it is that there is no dialogue with (President Bashar al-Assad)".[7]

According to Martti Ahtisaari who held discussions about Syria with the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in February 2012, a Russian three-point plan, put forth by its ambassador, Vitaly Churkin included a proposal for Assad to cede power. The plan also required the Syrian government and the opposition to come to the negotiating table. It was ignored by the US, Britain and France, because at the time they thought that Assad's regime was about to fall.[8]

7 November 2013, Russia again announced it was trying to broker talks in Moscow between the Syrian government and opposition, seeing that the U.S. and Russian negotiators failed to agree on whether or not Assad should be forced out of office.[81] Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov said the Moscow talks could focus on humanitarian problems as well on some political issues.[81]

At the end of October 2015, on the initiative of Russia, Iran was for the first time invited to participate in the Syria peace talks in Vienna.[82]

On 22 February 2016, in Munich, foreign ministers of Russia and the U.S., as co-chairs of the ISSG,[83] announced that they had concluded a deal to seek a nationwide "cessation of hostilities" in Syria[84] that came into effect on 27 February 2016 at 00:00 (Damascus time).[85]

On 23 February 2016, the Russian defence ministry inaugurated the Russian Reconciliation Center headquartered at its Khmeimim base, which was billed as a step undertaken in accordance with arrangements between Russia and the U.S.[86]

Military support for the Syrian government

[編輯]
Bashar and Asma al-Assad during a visit to Moscow (image taken in 2005)

Military assistance prior to the intervention

[編輯]

From early stages of the Syrian conflict, Russia, under its contractual obligations, delivered ammunition and weapons to the Syrian government;[87] in early 2012 Russia's contracts with Syria for arms were unofficially estimated to be worth 1.5 billion US dollars, comprising 10% of Russia's global arms sales.[87] The arms sales to the Syrian government provoked criticism on the part of Western as well as some Arab nations.[87] The Russian government dismissed criticism noting that the arms sales to Syria did not violate any standing arms embargoes.[87] On 1 June 2012, shortly after the Houla massacre, Russia's foreign ministry in turn blamed the massacre, in which 108 people were said to have been killed, on foreign assistance to Syrian rebels, including arms deliveries and mercenary training: "The tragedy in Houla showed what can be the outcome of financial aid and smuggling of modern weapons to rebels, recruitment of foreign mercenaries and flirting with various sorts of extremists".[88][89]

Besides providing the refurbished MI-25 helicopter gunships, Russia was also said to have transferred to Syria the Buk-M2 air defense system, the Bastion coastal defence missile system, and Yak-130 combat jet trainer.[90] Russian shipments of fuel have also assisted Assad,[91] and an unspecified number of military advisers are teaching Syrians how to use Russian weapons.[92] The head of Russia's federal service for military-technical co-operation confirmed that the repaired Syrian MI-25 attack helicopters were "ready to be delivered on time" adding that "Syria is our friend, and we fulfill all our obligations to our friends".[93] Amnesty International, noting the Syrian government's headlong deployment of military helicopters, criticised Russia: "Anyone supplying attack helicopters – or maintaining, repairing or upgrading them – for the Syrian government displays a wanton disregard for humanity."[94] Human Rights Watch warned Russia's state-owned arms-trading company Rosoboronexport in a letter that, under international law, "providing weapons to Syria while crimes against humanity are being committed may translate into assisting in the commission of those crimes", and called on governments and companies around the world to stop signing new contracts and consider suspending current dealings with the Russian company.[95]

In May 2013, Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Moscow in a bid to convince Russian president Vladimir Putin not to sell S-300 surface-to-air missile batteries and 144 missiles to Assad's government. The long-range air defense system would be a leap for Syria's current air defense system, enabling them to down fighter planes and cruise missiles.[96]

The Assad government was reported to have used Russian-supplied MI-8 and Mi-17 helicopters to carry out barrel-bomb attacks in Homs. According to former senior American intelligence official Jeffrey White, Russia was most likely providing spare parts such as engines, transmissions and rotors.[97]

In January 2014, a Russian company AR 514 (514 авиационный ремонтный завод) posted photos in their portfolio showing them performing repairs and upgrade on Su-24 identified to belong to Syrian fleet.[來源請求] In 2015 Assad confirmed in an interview that Russia has been supplying arms to Syria based on contracts signed before and after the beginning of the conflict.[98]

Syrian officers and air defence personnel were trained in Russia.[99]

2015–16 intervention and airstrikes

[編輯]
主條目：Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War
Barack Obama meets with Vladimir Putin to discuss Syria, 29 September 2015

As of September 2015, Russia has stepped up its military presence in Syria, deploying 12 Su-25 ground attack aircraft, 12 Su-24 interdictor aircraft,[100][101] 6 Sukhoi Su-34 medium bombers[102][103] and 4 Su-30 multirole combat aircraft and 15 helicopters (including Mi-24 attack helicopters)[104] at the Bassel Al-Assad International Airport near Latakia.[105][106][107][108][109] The planes are protected by at least two or possibly three SA-22 surface-to-air, antiaircraft systems, and unarmed MQ-1 Predator-like surveillance drones are being used to fly reconnaissance missions.[106] In addition to air forces, ground forces include 6 T-90 tanks, 15 artillery pieces, 35 armored personnel carriers and 200 Marines (with housing facilities for 1,500 personnel)[110] BM-30 multiple missile launchers have been spotted near Latakia.[來源請求]

On 30 September 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin requested permission from Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian parliament, to deploy the country's military in Syria.[來源請求] On the same day, Federation Council approved the use of Russian military in Syria to fight terrorist groups, the Islamic State in particular.[來源請求] Permission was granted after a unanimous vote, however any combat operations will be limited to using the air force.[111] Russian media reported that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had asked for Russia to intervene by providing military assistance.[112]

On 30 September 2015, Russia launched its first airstrikes against targets in Rastan, Talbiseh, and Zafaraniya in Homs province of Syria.[113][114][115][116] Moscow gave the United States a one-hour advance notice of its operations.[117] The Homs area is crucial to President Bashar al-Assad's control of western Syria. Insurgent control of the area would separate the coastal cities of Latakia- where Russian aircraft are based- and Tartous, where Russia operates a naval facility from Damascus.[118]

On 1 October 2015, the Russian defence ministry spokesman said Russia had deployed over 50 aircraft (including also Su-34) in Syria: "The air group was deployed on very short notice. We have been able to do it, as most of the materiel and ammunition had already been there, at our depot in Tartus. We only had to move our aircraft and deliver some equipment."

At the end of December 2015, senior U.S. officials privately admitted that Russia, while maintaining a relatively light military footprint, had achieved its central goal of stabilising the Assad government and, with the costs relatively low and minimal casualties, could sustain the operation at this level for years to come.[119]

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu with Iranian Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan, 16 February 2016

In February 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Syria said that part of Russia's arms deliveries to the Syrian government was gratis or on easy terms.[120]

In March 2016, the strategic city of Palmyra was recaptured by the Syrian Army after a large-scale offensive supported by Russian airstrikes.[121]

Role of private contractors

[編輯]

Officially, Russia is participating only in an air war over Syria, with a small number of special and support troops on the ground. However, in November 2016 Reuters published a report that contained evidence that Russian forces were playing a more substantial role in ground combat by employing contractors recruited through private agencies registered in foreign jurisdictions. According to the report, despite their unofficial status, these troops operated in coordination with Russia's regular military and were given benefits back home normally available to serving soldiers.[1] Russian contractors fighting in Syria are reportedly paid $6,500 a month.[122]

According to publications by Russian media, Russian contract fighters had taken part in combat in Syria before the formal Russian intervention began in September 2015.[123] According to an official in a Ukrainian law enforcement agency, at least 1,700 Russian contractors have been deployed to Syria, many of whom had earlier served in Ukraine.[122]

Russian nationals fighting for rebel/jihadist groups

[編輯]

In May 2016, Reuters published a Special Report titled "How Russia allowed homegrown radicals to go and fight in Syria" that, based on first-hand accounts, said that at least in the period between 2012 and 2014 the Russian government agencies appeared to run a programme to facilitate and encourage Russian radicals and militants to leave Russia and go to Turkey and then on to Syria; the persons in question had joined jihadist groups, some fighting with the ISIL.[124]

A top leader of ISIL, Abu Omar al-Shishani, initially led a group of several hundred fighters, mostly from ex-Soviet states. In June 2016 Nikolai Bordyuzha estimated that 10,000 militants from ex-Soviet states were fighting alongside jihadist groups in the Middle East, including Syria.[125] In July 2016, the British press cited ″experts″ as believing that ISIL fielded at least three exclusively Russian-speaking "Caucasian" (often led by Chechens) battalions of about 150 men each.[126]

Cooperation attempts with U.S. and UK

[編輯]
The foreign ministers of the US, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in Vienna, before a four-way discussion focused on Syria, October 29, 2015

Putin's proposal, mid-October 2015, that the U.S. receive a high-level Russian delegation and that a U.S. delegation arrive in Moscow to discuss coordinated action against terrorism in Syria was declined by both the United States[127] [128] and the United Kingdom.[129][130]

Discussing a long-term political settlement

[編輯]

On 20 October 2015, three weeks into the Russian military campaign in Syria, Russian President Vladimir Putin met Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Moscow to discuss their joint military campaign "against terrorism" and "a long-term settlement, based on a political process that involves all political forces, ethnic and religious groups" in Syria.[131][132]

Reactions

[編輯]
參見：Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War § Reactions

Domestic

[編輯]

In May 2012, the Russian Orthodox Church and its primate Patriarch Kirill I were reported by the U.S. mainstream press to be supportive of the existing government in Syria; the Church's leadership alluded to the potential threat to Christians in Syria that had comprised 10% of the country's population.[133]

In September 2015, one of Russia's Muslim (Sunni) leaders, Chief Mufti Talgat Tadzhuddin said: "We fully back the use of a contingent of Russian armed forces in the battle against international terrorism."[134]

In November 2015, Tadzhuddin publicly claimed that he had proposed to Vladimir Putin that Syria be annexed.

In early January 2016, Patriarch Kirill publicly endorsed Russia's military operation in Syria, saying that the campaign in that country that "is literally our neighbour" was "defence of the fatherland".[135][136][137]

In May 2019, The Moscow Times reported that "Fifty-five percent of Russian respondents say their country should end its military campaign in Syria, up from 49 percent in August 2017, according to a poll published by Levada".[138] According to an August 2019 poll by Public Opinion Foundation, only 10% of Russians see the Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War as a "success".[139]

Foreign

[編輯]
Vladimir Putin, Hassan Rouhani, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Russia, 2017

In January 2012, Human Rights Watch criticised Russia for "repeating the mistakes of Western governments during the Arab Spring by continuing to support a longstanding authoritarian ally [Assad] whose people have clearly expressed the desire for democratic change".[140] The human rights group also accused Russia of selectively using one of its reports to support a one-sided position on Syria.[141]

Former UK ambassador to Russia from 2004 to 2008, Tony Brenton, said in April 2012 that Russia is looking – in Syria – for its first opportunity since the Cold War to boost its brokering abilities.[63]

In October 2015, Robert Fisk, Middle East correspondent for The Independent, wrote: "The Russian air force in Syria has flown straight into the West's fantasy air space. The Russians, we are now informed, are bombing the "moderates" in Syria – "moderates" whom even the Americans admitted two months ago, no longer existed."[142]

The New York Times opined that with anti-government insurgents in Syria receiving for the first time bountiful supplies of U.S.-made anti-tank missiles and with Russia raising the number of airstrikes against the government's opponents that had raised morale in both camps, broadening war objectives and hardening political positions, the conflict was turning into an all-out proxy war between the U.S. and Russia.[143] This analysis was shared by the Dutch quality newspaper NRC Handelsblad that drew parallels with the situation in Afghanistan in the 1980s.[144] In 2016 Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Seymour Hersh expressed the view that Russia's military campaign against militant groups in Syria was "very good" and more effective than the U.S.-led campaigns, stating "I don't know why we persist on living in the Cold War, but we do. Russia actually did a very good job. They … did the bombing that was more effective than what we do, I think that's fair to say."[145]

  •  美國: The US-led coalition that is launching its own airstrikes against ISIS demanded that Russia stop attacking targets other than ISIS. "We call on the Russian Federation to immediately cease its attacks on the Syrian opposition and civilians and to focus its efforts on fighting ISIL," said the US-led coalition.[146] it also objected to Assad's participation in the intelligence sharing.[147] By the opposition other than ISIS it is meant the groups have received training and weapons from US and other Assad's enemies.[146] "We do not support the presence of Syrian government officials who are part of a regime that has brutalized its own citizens," said Col. Steven H. Warren, the spokesman for the US-led coalition.[147]
  • Template:Country data Britain: "They are backing the butcher Assad, which is a terrible mistake, for them and the world," said British Prime Minister David Cameron.[146][148]

See also

[編輯]

References

[編輯]
  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Tsvetkova, Maria; Zverev, Anton. Ghost soldiers: the Russians secretly dying for the Kremlin in Syria. Reuters. 3 November 2016 [4 November 2016]. （原始內容存檔於3 November 2016）. 
  2. ^ Russian vetoes are putting UN security council's legitimacy at risk, says US. The Guardian. 23 September 2015 [10 January 2016]. （原始內容存檔於17 May 2019）. Russia has used its veto powers four times to block resolutions on Syria that Moscow sees as damaging to its ally, the regime of Bashar al-Assad. 
  3. ^ 3.0 3.1 Russia says U.N. Syria draft unacceptable: Itar-Tass. Reuters. 27 January 2012 [27 January 2012]. （原始內容存檔於28 January 2012）. 
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 Statement by Mr. Vladimir V. Putin, President of the Russian Federation, at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, 28 September 2015. (Unofficial translation.) 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期8 May 2017. un.org. Retrieved 1 October 2015.
  5. ^ 5.0 5.1 Khomami, Nadia. UN general assembly: International community has failed Syrians, says Rouhani. TheGuardian. [9 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於11 October 2015）. 
  6. ^ 6.0 6.1 Syrian crisis: Russia air strikes 'strengthen IS'. BBC News. 2 October 2015 [3 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於3 October 2015）. 
  7. ^ 7.0 7.1 Russia says Syria agrees to peace talks with opposition amid mounting pressures. Al Arabiya. 30 January 2012 [29 November 2013]. （原始內容存檔於3 December 2013）. 
  8. ^ 8.0 8.1 Borger, Julian. West 'ignored Russian offer in 2012 to have Syria's Assad step aside'. The Guardian. 15 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於8 October 2016）. 
  9. ^ Weir, Fred. Why isn't Russia singling out ISIS in Syria? Because it never said it would. Christian Science Monitor. 14 October 2015 [17 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於16 October 2015）. 
  10. ^ Hubbard, Ben. A Look at the Army of Conquest, a Prominent Rebel Alliance in Syria. The New York Times. 1 October 2015 [3 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於25 October 2015）. 
  11. ^ Gordon, Michael R.; Schmitt, Eric. Airstrikes by Russia Buttress Turkey in Battle vs. ISIS. New York Times. 9 January 2017 [26 February 2017]. （原始內容存檔於18 May 2017）. 
  12. ^ Solmaz, Mehmet. Russia-Turkey row visible in northern Syria. Orient-news.net. [8 September 2019]. （原始內容存檔於11 October 2018） （英語）. 
  13. ^ Russian hand seen behind increased bombing of Syrian hospitals 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期16 October 2018.. NBC News. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
  14. ^ Russian Military in Syria. Airwars. [8 July 2022]. 
  15. ^ 15.0 15.1 Syria conflict: 34% rise in civilian deaths caused by Russian airstrikes, report finds 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期16 October 2018.. Independent. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
  16. ^ Russia Loses Seat at the UN Human Rights Council 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期16 October 2018.. The Diplomat. Retrieved 16 October 2018.
  17. ^ 17.0 17.1 Trenin, Dmitri. Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria: Why Moscow Wants To Halt the Arab Spring. Foreign Affairs.com. 5 February 2012 [15 March 2012]. （原始內容存檔於10 March 2012）. 
  18. ^ Kreutz, Andrej. Russia in the Middle East: friend or foe?. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group. 2007. 
  19. ^ A History of the Middle East, Peter Mansfield, Penguin 2010, 3rd edition, p.293 ISBN 978-0-718-19231-0
  20. ^ International New York Times, 3 October 2015.
  21. ^ Breslauer, George W. Soviet Strategy in the Middle East. Boston, Massachusetts. 1990. 
  22. ^ Peel, Michael; Clover, Charles. Syria and Russia's 'special relationship'. Financial Times. 9 July 2012 [11 July 2012]. （原始內容存檔於24 July 2012）. 
  23. ^ Lea, David. A Political Chronology of the Middle East. London, United Kingdom: Europa Publications. 2001. 
  24. ^ International conflict. Iran to join, Russia already bombing Opposition's positions.. Reuters.com. Reuters. 2 October 2015 [4 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於4 October 2015）. 
  25. ^ Khaled Yacoub Oweis; Erika Solomon. Bombardment of Syria's homeless kills 21 people. Reuters. 22 February 2012 [21 July 2014]. （原始內容存檔於3 October 2013）. 
  26. ^ 26.0 26.1 26.2 Seymour Hersh, 'Military to Military,' London Review of Books, Vol. 38 No. 1,7 January 2016 pp.11–14. Retrieved 13 May 2016.
  27. ^ Jay Solomon & Nour Malas. U.S. Bolsters Ties to Fighters in Syria. Wall Street Journal. 14 June 2012 [17 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  28. ^ Landler, Mark. U.S. Considers Resuming Nonlethal Aid to Syrian Opposition. New York Times. 10 January 2014 [17 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於20 July 2018）. 
  29. ^ Arab league allows members to arm rebels and offers seat to opposition. Al Bawaba. 9 February 2013 [8 March 2013]. （原始內容存檔於9 March 2013）. 
  30. ^ Arab League summit opens in Doha with focus on Syrian crisis – Xinhua | English.news.cn. News.xinhuanet.com. 26 March 2013 [29 May 2013]. （原始內容存檔於28 May 2013）. 
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 31.2 The Long Road to Damascus. The Economist 402 (8771). 11 February 2012: 25–28. 
  32. ^ 32.0 32.1 32.2 Sharp, Jeremy M.; Christopher M. Blanchard (編), Unrest in Syria and U.S. Sanctions Against the Asad Regime, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 26 March 2012 
  33. ^ "Militants from Russia's North Caucasus join "jihad" in Syria 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期21 November 2015.". Reuters. 6 March 2013.
  34. ^ "Why being Chechen is a badge of honor for Islamist militants 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期20 August 2018.". The Washington Post. 3 July 2014.
  35. ^ "Security Service At Moscow Airport Detains Siberian Man Suspected To Join ISIS In Syria 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期16 February 2018.". IBTimes. 24 September 2015.
  36. ^ 36.0 36.1 Russia in Syria: President Putin's Middle East adventure exposes terrorist threat now facing Moscow. The Independent. 9 October 2015 [7 December 2017]. （原始內容存檔於7 December 2017）. 
  37. ^ Mirovalev, Mansur. Syria's war: A showroom for Russian arms sales. Al Jazeera. 6 Apr 2016 [24 May 2021]. 
  38. ^ Sharkov, Damien. Putin's Syria Campaign Could Boost Russian Arms Sales by $7 Billion. Newsweek. 29 March 2016 [24 May 2021]. 
  39. ^ Herszenhorn, David. For Syria, Reliant on Russia for Weapons and Food, Old Bonds Run Deep. The New York Times (para. 33). 18 February 2012 [23 May 2021]. 
  40. ^ Russia Covered up Soldier's Death in Syria, Media Reports. The Moscow Times. 9 January 2019 [10 January 2019]. （原始內容存檔於27 January 2019） （英語）. 
  41. ^ Meyer, Henry; Cook, Brad; Arkhipov, Ilya. Russia Warns U.S., NATO Against Military Aid to Syria Protests After Libya. Bloomberg. 2 June 2011 [28 June 2011]. （原始內容存檔於4 June 2011）. 
  42. ^ US seeks Russia's cooperation over Syria resolution. Newsleaks.com. 18 June 2011 [4 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於12 March 2014）. 
  43. ^ Al Jazeera Syria Live Blog: Saturday, 11 June 2011 – 10:33. http://blogs.aljazeera.net/liveblog/syria-jun-11-2011-1133. Also at youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gTmd5MFmhQc&feature=player_embedded 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期15 October 2015.
  44. ^ 44.0 44.1 Russian envoy calls for end to violence in Syria. NBC News. 28 June 2011 [4 October 2015]. 
  45. ^ Baetz, Juergen. Medvedev: Syria must not go the same way as Libya. Bloomberg Businessweek. 19 July 2011 [20 July 2011]. （原始內容存檔於21 July 2011）. 
  46. ^ Russian MFA Press and Information Department Comment on the Situation in Syria. Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Russian Federation. 1 August 2011 [3 August 2011]. （原始內容存檔於9 August 2011）. 
  47. ^ Russia hardens stance on Syria. Times Live. Reuters. 3 August 2011 [4 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於4 August 2011）. 
  48. ^ Al Jazeera Libya Live Blog. "Syria – Aug 4, 2011 – 07:32 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期25 August 2011."
  49. ^ Khaled Yacoub Oweis. U.S. envoy visits Syria town, U.N. launches inquiry. Reuters. 23 August 2011 [30 August 2011]. （原始內容存檔於30 August 2011）. 
  50. ^ Charbonneau, Louis. Russian U.N. envoy says not time for Syria sanctions. Reuters. 23 August 2011 [30 August 2011]. （原始內容存檔於26 August 2011）. 
  51. ^ 51.0 51.1 51.2 Charbonneau, Louis. Russia, China resist U.N. Syria sanctions push: envoys. Reuters. 26 August 2011 [30 August 2011]. （原始內容存檔於29 August 2011）. 
  52. ^ 52.0 52.1 'U.N. Resolution on Syria Blocked by Russia and China' 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期15 July 2018.. The New York Times, 4 October 2011. Retrieved 7 October 2015.
  53. ^ 53.0 53.1 MacFarquhar, Neil. With Rare Double U.N. Veto on Syria, Russia and China Try to Shield Friend. The New York Times. 5 October 2011 [22 March 2012]. （原始內容存檔於12 March 2012）. 
  54. ^ 54.0 54.1 54.2 Russia will not allow Libya-style military intervention in Syria. Middle East Online. 1 November 2011 [4 November 2011]. （原始內容存檔於10 February 2013）. 
  55. ^ Syria opposition gains regional backers. CNN. 11 October 2011 [4 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於14 May 2012）. 
  56. ^ 56.0 56.1 Russia proposes U.N. resolution on Syria; U.S. hopes to work with Moscow on draft. Al Arabiya. 15 December 2011 [1 February 2012]. （原始內容存檔於18 December 2011）. 
  57. ^ Russia to promote its own Syria resolution at U.N.. Reuters. 26 January 2012 [27 January 2012]. （原始內容存檔於27 January 2012）. 
  58. ^ MacFarquhar, Neil. Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Crisis in Syria. The New York Times. 4 February 2012 [28 February 2017]. （原始內容存檔於7 March 2017）. 
  59. ^ Gutterman, Steve. Russia Out to Maintain Clout, Improve Image on Syria. Reuters. 21 March 2012 [11 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  60. ^ Syrian opposition delegation holds talks with Russian diplomats in Moscow. The Washington Post. Associated Press. 16 April 2012 [19 April 2012]. （原始內容存檔於23 April 2019）. 
  61. ^ 61.0 61.1 61.2 61.3 61.4 UN Security Council reaches tentative agreement on increasing monitors in Syria to 300. The Washington Post. Associated Press. 20 April 2012 [20 April 2012]. （原始內容存檔於23 April 2019）. 
  62. ^ UN Authorizes 300 unarmed Syria Monitors. CNN. 21 April 2012 [22 April 2012]. （原始內容存檔於19 January 2013）. 
  63. ^ 63.0 63.1 [失效連結]Meyer, Henry. Putin Pins Hope on Syria Cease-Fire to Combat U.S. Supremacy. Bloomberg Businessweek. 20 April 2012 [20 April 2012]. （原始內容存檔於23 April 2012）. 
  64. ^ Hubbard, Ben; Jordans, Robert. UN: Most of 108 killed in Syria were executed. CBS8. Associated Press. 29 May 2012 [29 May 2012]. （原始內容存檔於30 May 2012）. 
  65. ^ Russia Condemns Syria Over Massacre. Time. 28 May 2012 [29 May 2012]. （原始內容存檔於29 May 2012）. 
  66. ^ Syria massacre: Rebels share blame, says Russia's Lavrov. BBC News. 28 May 2012 [31 May 2012]. （原始內容存檔於28 May 2012）. 
  67. ^ Houla: How a massacre unfolded. BBC News. 29 May 2012 [21 July 2018]. （原始內容存檔於21 June 2012）. 
  68. ^ Rosenberg, Steve. Why Russia Sells Syria Arms. BBC News. 29 June 2012 [18 August 2012]. （原始內容存檔於19 August 2012）. 
  69. ^ "Vladimir Putin admits Bashar al-Assad responsible for Syrian uprising 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期26 January 2019.". The Daily Telegraph, 11 June 2013. Retrieved 15 October 2015.
  70. ^ "Russia reports pullout from small base in Syria 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期15 July 2018.". The Washington Post. 26 June 2013
  71. ^ Michael R. Gordon; Steven Lee Myers. Obama Calls Russia Offer on Syria Possible 'Breakthrough'. The New York Times. 10 September 2013 [13 September 2013]. （原始內容存檔於12 September 2013）. 
  72. ^ Vladimir V. Putin. A Plea for Caution From Russia. The New York Times. 12 September 2013: A31 [13 September 2013]. （原始內容存檔於12 September 2013）. 
  73. ^ NRC Handelsblad, 16 and 18 September 2015.
  74. ^ Le Monde, 17 September 2015.
  75. ^ 'Poutine s'engage en Syrie pour remettre Assad en selle' (Putin engages himself in Syria to put Assad back in the saddle) 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期3 February 2016.. Il Blog di Pierluigi Piccini, 17 September 2015. Retrieved 29 October 2015. (N.B.: this happens to be exactly the article that was published that same day in Le Monde.)
  76. ^ Putin: U.S. should keep training Syrian rebels. United Press International. [14 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於13 October 2015）. 
  77. ^ Putin slams US on Syria, says partners have 'mush for brains'. Yahoo News. 13 October 2015 [14 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於19 October 2015）. 
  78. ^ ТАСС: Политика – Путин: РФ стремится не к лидерству в Сирии, а хочет внести вклад в борьбу с терроризмом. tass.ru. 13 October 2015 [21 December 2016]. （原始內容存檔於21 December 2016） （俄語）. 
  79. ^ Инвестиционный форум "Россия зовёт!" • Президент России. kremlin.ru. 13 October 2015 [21 December 2016]. （原始內容存檔於21 December 2016） （俄語）. 
  80. ^ Медведев назвал отказ США от переговоров по Сирии слабостью 0. Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 16 October 2015 [23 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於17 October 2015）. 
  81. ^ 81.0 81.1 Canceled Syria talks may get new start in Moscow 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期19 October 2017., USA Today, 7 November 2013. Retrieved 25 November 2013.
  82. ^ After a U.S. Shift, Iran Has a Seat at Talks on War in Syria. New York Times. 29 October 2015 [29 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於31 October 2015）. 
  83. ^ Joint Statement of the United States and the Russian Federation, as Co-Chairs of the ISSG, on Cessation of Hostilities in Syria. U.S. Department of State. 22 February 2016 [25 June 2017]. （原始內容存檔於18 April 2017）. 
  84. ^ Temporary truce comes into effect. BBC News. 26 February 2016 [21 July 2018]. （原始內容存檔於25 July 2018）. 
  85. ^ U.N. demands Syria parties halt fighting, peace talks set for March 7. Reuters. 26 February 2016 [7 December 2017]. （原始內容存檔於23 June 2017）. 
  86. ^ На авиабазе Хмеймим начал работу Координационный центр по примирению враждующих сторон на территории Сирии: Министерство обороны Российской Федерации. [27 June 2017]. （原始內容存檔於17 January 2019）. 
  87. ^ 87.0 87.1 87.2 87.3 Galpin, Richard. Russian arms shipments bolster Syria's embattled Assad. BBC News. 10 January 2012 [4 February 2012]. （原始內容存檔於22 May 2019）. 
  88. ^ Houla massacre result of 'foreign aid' to rebels: Russia. Al Arabiya. 1 June 2012 [17 January 2016]. （原始內容存檔於3 February 2016）. 
  89. ^ UN calls for investigation into Houla killings in Syria. BBC News. 1 June 2012 [21 July 2018]. （原始內容存檔於13 January 2013）. 
  90. ^ Sayginer, Ozge. Why Russia will never back down? Reasons behind supporting the Assad regime. The European Strategist. 20 June 2012 [23 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於1 March 2014）. 
  91. ^ Donati, Jessica; Julia Payne. How Russia, Iran keep fuel flowing to Syria. Reuters. 26 April 2012 [28 April 2012]. （原始內容存檔於27 April 2012）. 
  92. ^ Syria: Moscow sends navy vessels to Syrian port. The Scotsman. 19 June 2012 [23 June 2012]. 
  93. ^ Elder, Miriam., The Guardian, Thursday 28 June 2012., Syria will receive attack helicopters from Russia, Kremlin confirms http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/28/syria-receive-attack-helicopter-risussia?newsfeed=true
  94. ^ Syria: Reports of helicopter shipments underscore need for arms embargo. Amnesty International. 19 June 2012 [25 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於22 June 2012）. 
  95. ^ Isolate Syria's Arms Suppliers. Human Rights Watch. 3 June 2012 [29 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於1 July 2012）. 
  96. ^ Jay Solomon, Adam Entous & Julian E. Barnes. U.S. Is Warned Russia Plans Syria Arms Sale. The Wall Street Journal. 9 May 2013 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於13 December 2013）. 
  97. ^ Gordon, Michael R.; Sanger, David E.; Schmitt, Eric. U.S. Steps Up Criticism of Russian Role in Syrian War. The New York Times. 17 February 2014 [28 February 2017]. （原始內容存檔於6 November 2015）. 
  98. ^ Syria gets Russian arms under deals signed since conflict began: Assad. Reuters. 31 March 2015 [31 March 2015]. （原始內容存檔於31 March 2015）. 
  99. ^ Insight: Russia's Syria diplomacy, a game of smoke and mirrors. Reuters. 6 June 2013 [6 June 2013]. （原始內容存檔於6 June 2013）. 
  100. ^ Thomas Gibbons-Neff. This is the airpower Russia has in Syria. The Washington Post. 21 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於8 June 2019）. 
  101. ^ les premières images des avions russes en Syrie. YouTube. 28 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  102. ^ Six Russian Su-34 Fullback bomber have just arrived in Syria. And this is the route they have likely flown to get there.. 28 September 2015 [20 December 2016]. （原始內容存檔於9 June 2019）. 
  103. ^ Rogoway, Tyler. First Video Report From Russia's Air Base In Syria Shows Su-34s In Action. Foxtrot Alpha. 2 October 2015 [18 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  104. ^ [1] 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期19 October 2017. Russian Fighter Aircraft Arrive in Syria 21 September 2015, Stratfor
  105. ^ Janes | Latest defence and security news. [22 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於23 September 2015）. 
  106. ^ 106.0 106.1 Schmitt, Eric; MacFarquhar, Neil. Russia Expands Fleet in Syria With Jets That Can Attack Targets on Ground. New York Times. 21 September 2015 [17 January 2016]. （原始內容存檔於24 April 2019）. 
  107. ^ Russian Fighter Aircraft Arrive in Syria. Stratfor. [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於19 October 2017）. 
  108. ^ New Satellite Image unveils an impressive line-up of 12 Russian Su-25 Frogfoot attack jets in Syria!. The Aviationist. 21 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於1 October 2015）. 
  109. ^ Russian jets in Syria mean no-fly zone is 'out of the question', warn experts. The Daily Telegraph. 22 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於26 September 2015）. 
  110. ^ Schmitt, Eric; Gordon, Michael R. (14 Sep 2015). "Russian Moves in Syria Widen Role in Mideast 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期24 April 2019." The New York Times
  111. ^ Walker, Shaun. Russian parliament grants Vladimir Putin right to deploy military in Syria. The Guardian. 30 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於30 September 2015）. 
  112. ^ Совет Федерации разрешил использовать ВС России за рубежом. РИА Новости. 30 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於1 October 2015）. 
  113. ^ Russia begins air strikes in Syria. ABC News. 30 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於30 September 2015）. 
  114. ^ تلبيسة اللحظات الاولى من الغارات من الطيران الروسي واستخراج الشهداء والجرحى من تحت الانقاض – YouTube. YouTube. 30 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  115. ^ Walker, Shaun. Russia launches first airstrikes against targets in Syria. The Guardian. 30 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於30 September 2015）. 
  116. ^ U.S. official: Russia launches first Syria airstrike. USA Today. 30 September 2015 [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於2 October 2015）. 
  117. ^ Russia Confirms Carrying Out Airstrikes in Syria. Haaretz. [30 September 2015]. （原始內容存檔於1 October 2015）. 
  118. ^ France claims Russian jets have struck rebel, not IS forces in Homs. euronews. 30 September 2015 [18 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  119. ^ U.S. sees bearable costs, key goals met for Russia in Syria so far. Reuters. 28 December 2015 [7 December 2017]. （原始內容存檔於15 April 2019）. 
  120. ^ Александр Кинщак: Говорить о наличии скрытых планов обеспечить долгосрочное военное присутствие РФ в Сирии неуместно. Interfax. 8 February 2016 [8 February 2016]. （原始內容存檔於9 February 2016） （俄語）. Однако с учетом того, что финансовые возможности Дамаска в условиях развязанной террористами войны на истощение, общей деградации экономики и западных санкций значительно уменьшились, часть поставок осуществляется безвозмездно либо на льготных условиях. 
  121. ^ Isis 'losing control' of Palmyra as Syrian troops backed by Russian air strikes approach ancient city. Independent. 26 March 2016. 
  122. ^ 122.0 122.1 Tsvetkova, Maria. Heritage, Timothy , 編. Dying for a paycheck: the Russian civilians fighting in Syria. Reuters. December 21, 2017 [21 December 2017]. （原始內容存檔於21 December 2017）. 
  123. ^ Российские наемники в боях за Пальмиру 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期24 April 2019. Gazeta.ru, 24 March 2016.
  124. ^ How Russia allowed homegrown radicals to go and fight in Syria. Reuters. 13 May 2016 [7 December 2017]. （原始內容存檔於9 February 2018）. 
  125. ^ Ex-Soviet exiles give Islamic State violence a Russian accent. Reuters. 4 July 2016 [7 December 2017]. （原始內容存檔於9 October 2016）. 
  126. ^ 'Your son has become a martyr': the Russian fighters from Dagestan rising up the ranks of Islamic State 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期15 April 2019. The Telegraph, 30 July 2017.
  127. ^ Russia's Lavrov says Washington declines deeper military talks on Syria. NEWSru. 14 October 2015 [17 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於8 December 2015）. 
  128. ^ "Это обидно": Лавров сообщил, что США отказались принять делегацию РФ для обсуждения сирийского кризиса. NEWSru. 14 October 2015 [16 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  129. ^ Parfitt, Tom. Britain has frozen us out, says Russian envoy. The Times. 26 October 2015 [26 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於28 October 2015）. 
  130. ^ Российский посол в Лондоне обвинил Британию в замораживании дипломатических контактов с РФ 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期24 April 2019. NEWSru, 26 October 2015.
  131. ^ Assad Makes Unannounced Trip to Moscow to Discuss Syria With Putin. The New York Times. 21 October 2015 [27 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於26 October 2015）. 
  132. ^ Meeting with President of Syria Bashar Assad. President of Russia. 21 October 2015 [23 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於21 October 2015）. 
  133. ^ Barry, Ellen. Russian Church Is a Strong Voice Opposing Intervention in Syria. The New York Times. 31 May 2012 [11 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於15 October 2015）. 
  134. ^ Church Says Russia Fighting 'Holy Battle' in Syria. Yahoo! News. 30 September 2015 [29 March 2021]. 
  135. ^ Патриарх Кирилл поддержал военную операцию России в Сирии. Interfax. 7 January 2016 [9 January 2016]. （原始內容存檔於9 January 2016）. 
  136. ^ Патриарх Кирилл: военные действия РФ в Сирии – это и есть защита Отечества. [9 January 2016]. （原始內容存檔於10 January 2016）. 
  137. ^ Рождественское интервью Святейшего Патриарха Кирилла телеканалу "Россия" / Патриарх / Патриархия.ru. [9 January 2016]. （原始內容存檔於14 January 2016）. 
  138. ^ Fewer Than Half of Russians Support Syria Campaign, Poll Says. The Moscow Times. 6 May 2019 [9 May 2019]. （原始內容存檔於8 May 2019）. 
  139. ^ The pandemic may change Russia's calculus in the Middle East. Al Jazeera. 13 April 2020. 
  140. ^ Russia Repeats Western Mistakes in Arab Spring. Human Rights Watch. 23 January 2012 [11 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於6 October 2015）. 
  141. ^ Russia: Selective Use of Syria Findings. Human Rights Watch. 23 March 2012 [30 June 2012]. （原始內容存檔於7 June 2012）. 
  142. ^ Fisk, Robert. Syria's 'moderates' have disappeared ... and there are no good guys. The Independent. 4 October 2015 [8 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於8 October 2015）. 
  143. ^ U.S. Weaponry Is Turning Syria into Proxy War With Russia. The New York Times. 12 October 2015 [14 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於13 October 2015）. 
  144. ^ In Syrië dreigt nu een proxy-oorlog: Rusland vs Amerika VS leveren extra wapens aan rebellen die vechten tegen Assad, lees: Moskou. Terug naar jaren 80 in Afghanistan. 互聯網檔案館的存檔，存檔日期3 February 2016. NRC Handelsblad, 14 October 2015 ("In Syria, a proxy-war now is looming").
  145. ^ Klippenstein, Ken. Exclusive Interview: Seymour Hersh Dishes on Saudi Oil Money Bribes and the Killing of Osama Bin Laden. 20 April 2016 [4 May 2016]. （原始內容存檔於2 May 2016） –透過AlterNet. 
  146. ^ 146.0 146.1 146.2 US, allies ask Russia to halt strikes outside IS areas in Syria. REUTERS. 3 October 2015 [3 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於4 October 2015）. 
  147. ^ 147.0 147.1 Gordon, Michael R. Russia Surprises U.S. With Accord on Battling ISIS. The New York Times. 27 September 2015 [28 February 2017]. （原始內容存檔於9 July 2017）. 
  148. ^ Cameron condemns Russia's military action in Syria as 'terrible mistake' – video. The Guardian. 4 October 2015 [22 October 2015]. （原始內容存檔於18 January 2016）. 

Further reading

[編輯]

Template:Syrian Civil War Template:Vladimir Putin Template:Syria topics Template:Russia topics

背景

[編輯]

自 18 世紀初以來，奧地利和俄羅斯對奧斯曼帝國北部邊境施加壓力，導致奧斯曼敘利亞各阿拉伯省份的地方長官們開始反抗統治。[1] 1768 年，當俄羅斯帝國正在奧斯曼帝國邊境附近鎮壓波蘭起義時，一個哥薩克軍團追趕一些叛亂分子越過邊境，並在巴爾塔鎮進行了大屠殺。[2] 蘇丹最終作出回應，向俄羅斯宣戰。[3] 他向馬穆魯克王朝的阿里貝伊尋求軍事援助，阿里貝伊是當時奧斯曼帝國埃及最有權勢的官員。阿里密切關注着戰爭的進程，並於 1769 年派遣所需的 3,000 名士兵前往援助奧斯曼帝國。然而，次年年初，他宣佈埃及獨立，主要是為了回應與俄羅斯的戰爭。後來，他與巴勒斯坦北部富有的阿拉伯統治者查希爾·奧馬爾結盟。阿里和查希爾在反對伊斯蘭基本教義派、反對蘇丹對歐洲的孤立主義政策以及禁止奧斯曼帝國政要進入其宮廷等方面有着共同的立場。[4]

伊凡·艾瓦佐夫斯基的《切什梅夜戰》 （1848 年)[n 1]

與此同時，由於俄羅斯在黑海缺乏一支有組織的艦隊，葉卡捷琳娜大帝與伯爵阿列克謝·格里戈里耶維奇·奧爾洛夫制定了計劃，從波羅的海艦隊中抽調大量艦船，部署到地中海。[5] 俄羅斯希望他們從背後襲擊土耳其海峽，並希望其在愛琴海的海軍存在能激起希臘的叛亂。[1] 這支新組建的地中海艦隊由奧爾洛夫率領，海軍上將格里戈里·斯皮里多夫指揮，於 9 月從哥本哈根啟航。 23，1769。到三月 1770年12月1日，第一支支隊停泊在摩里亞南部海域，奧爾洛夫起義就在此爆發。隨後幾個月，該地區不同地點遭到轟炸和部隊登陸。[6] 七月 7 一支土耳其艦隊在切斯馬海戰中被擊潰，奧斯曼帝國海軍陷入癱瘓，使得俄羅斯海軍在戰爭的剩餘時間裏掌控了地中海的海軍指揮權。倖存的土耳其船隻撤退至達達尼爾海峽。海軍少將約翰·埃爾芬斯通提議直接攻擊君士坦丁堡，但奧爾洛夫說服他用艦隊封鎖海峽，而艦隊的其他部分則在愛琴海北部發動攻勢。[7]

自 15 世紀以來，俄羅斯編年史就將穆斯林描述為哈加利人。這是一個貶義詞，暗示他們是被流放到西奈沙漠的聖經夏甲的後裔。俄羅斯宮廷知道奧斯曼帝國的突尼斯、阿爾及利亞和的黎波里塔尼亞在 18 世紀已經實現自治。[8] 儘管嘉芙蓮對穆斯林持負面看法，但還是毫不猶豫地將他們視為潛在的盟友。 1769 年 7 月 15 日，她指示斯皮里多夫除非受到挑釁，否則不要攻擊上述國家的船隻，並促使他試圖讓巴巴里國家反抗他們的奧斯曼帝國霸主。由於突尼斯和阿爾及利亞站在奧斯曼帝國一邊作戰，葉卡捷琳娜的計劃未能實現，而的黎波里的阿里帕夏與奧爾洛夫的通信也沒有取得重大成果。[9]

1770 年末，阿里貝伊派遣 40,000 人的軍隊前往巴勒斯坦，由他信任的將軍穆罕默德貝伊阿布扎哈卜指揮。1771 年春，這支軍隊與查希爾的軍隊會合，並佔領了黎凡特的幾座城鎮。然而，六月初大馬士革陷落後不久，奧斯曼帝國特工就成功說服阿布·扎哈卜反對阿里貝伊，並承諾任命他為埃及統治者，而不是他的霸主。阿布·扎哈卜率軍撤退，並與他的前主人捲入了爭奪埃及控制權的權力鬥爭。而扎希爾則在自己的酋長國中陷入孤立，不得不獨自面對奧斯曼帝國不可避免的反攻。[10] 阿里貝伊當時確信，通過與俄羅斯結盟，他可以扭轉最近的挫折。十二月 1771 年 2 月 2 日，他派遣一名名叫雅庫布的亞美尼亞特使到愛琴海帕羅斯島的地中海艦隊總部與奧爾洛夫會面，並向俄羅斯人提出結盟。[11]

這一提議後來被沙皇皇后接受，但她是在阿里貝伊不再統治埃及之後才得知這一聯盟的。[n 2] 當他與阿布·扎哈卜之間的對峙最終升級為武裝衝突時，他被迫離開該國並向盟友查希爾尋求庇護。[13] 在不知道阿里逃走的情況下，奧爾洛夫命令與阿里取得聯繫，由希臘副官里佐指揮的一支支隊啟航前往達米埃塔，但在得知阿里的命運後很快就離開了港口。中隊隨後沿着巴勒斯坦海岸搜尋他，並最終於 6 月在阿克里找到了他。 3.里佐隨後派遣一支支隊前往北方，在貝魯特附近的提爾攔截了一艘奧斯曼護衛艦。與此同時，在西頓，查希爾的 6,000 名小軍隊正遭到包括德魯茲人在內的 30,000 名奧斯曼帝國軍隊的圍攻。里佐的艦船加入了駐軍，炮擊了奧斯曼帝國的襲擊者，襲擊者隨後不久撤退。[14]

首次職業

[編輯]
First bombardment of Beirut
日期18 June 1772 – 23 June 1772
地點
Beirut
結果 Occupation of the town until 28 June
參戰方
Imperial Russian Navy Druze garrison

新組建的聯盟希望利用奧斯曼帝國在西頓的挫折，決定將俄羅斯艦隊派遣到當時由德魯茲人控制的小港口城市貝魯特。根據研究員威廉·珀森 (William Persen) 的說法，這次遠征的目的既是讓德魯茲人陷入困境，又是為了懲罰他們站在土耳其政府一邊。封鎖他們的港口就可以實現這一目標。貝魯特也是該地區唯一一個至今仍受奧斯曼帝國統治的港口。[15]

里佐的艦隊很可能不知道俄羅斯和波特最近達成了停戰協議，於 6 月出現在該鎮海岸附近。 18 與泰爾和阿卡支隊重新會合後。這支部隊由兩艘護衛艦組成， Sv.尼古拉和Sv。帕維爾，四艘波拉卡帆船，五艘半帆船和四艘三桅帆船。該船運送的是一支主要由希臘和阿爾巴尼亞僱傭兵組成的步兵師。同一天，奧斯曼帝國開始炮擊該鎮，停靠在港口的船隻全部被擊沉。[16] 《葉卡捷琳娜二世和東方》一書的作者奧里昂在他的版本中寫道，里佐向貝魯特保衛者發出了 24 小時最後通牒，要求他們懸掛俄羅斯國旗並表示敬意。海軍攻勢持續了五天，其中六月登陸部隊的進攻未成功 21.經過兩天的猛烈轟炸，他們終於在六月登陸。 23並花了數小時洗劫該鎮及其集市。劫掠所得總額約為 550,000基爾什，包括貿易商品和現金。[n 3] 俄國人於 6 月離開 28 日，他從統治周圍山區的德魯茲埃米爾尤素夫·希哈布那裏得到了額外的報酬。希哈布還同意與聯盟建立為期四個月的聯盟關係。[18]

阿里貝伊起義結束

[編輯]

俄國人撤離後，奧斯曼帝國將貝魯特割讓給尤素夫·希哈布的黎巴嫩山酋長國。而希哈布則任命曾在阿里貝伊手下服役的艾哈邁德貝伊賈扎爾負責該鎮的保衛。[19] 當阿里在阿克里與他的盟友轟炸貝魯特時，他接見了他的使者雅各布。他乘坐一艘俄羅斯護衛艦前來，帶着葉卡捷琳娜的禮物和友好口信。葉卡捷琳娜在口信中向他保證，她將致力於俄羅斯與埃及統治者的聯盟。然而，阿里對這一姿態並不滿意，他尋求俄羅斯以步兵、炮兵和海軍支援的形式提供軍事援助，以從阿布·扎哈卜手中奪回埃及。他派遣一位新使者帶着此信息去見奧洛夫。根據歷史學家愛德華·洛克羅伊 (Édouard Lockroy) 的說法，他可能還向俄羅斯人提供了對耶路撒冷基督教聖地的控制權。[20]

奧爾洛夫回應阿里，他受與土耳其政府的停戰協議的約束。他承諾派遣一支由俄羅斯軍官和炮兵組成的小型部隊，並承諾一旦情況允許，將向阿里提供他所需要的一切援助。夏季，阿里和扎希爾的軍隊圍攻了雅法城。 9 月，一艘俄羅斯運輸船加入了圍攻，並在該城市附近投放了火炮。一個月後，這艘船起航，向奧洛夫帶來了新的懇求。[20] 另一支俄羅斯海軍支隊在中尉帕納奧蒂·阿萊克西亞諾（[21] Alexiano）的指揮下於11月抵達雅法，再次加入炮擊，並告知阿里奧爾洛夫計劃為他的事業組建一支大型艦隊。阿萊克西亞諾的艦隊由護衛艦Sv.組成。保羅和一些波拉卡人，此前還在達米埃塔附近摧毀了兩艘巴巴里船隻，並俘獲了一些較小的船隻。[22]

關於阿布·扎哈卜陣營中不服從命令的謠言和埃及日益增長的異議引起了阿里的注意。他變得不耐煩了，1773 年 4 月，他率領一支小部隊前往埃及，儘管一個月前他就已得到俄羅斯援助將很快抵達的保證。阿里的軍隊在開羅附近被對手的軍隊擊敗。他被捕並在幾天後死亡，可能是因中毒而死。[20] 與此同時，賈扎爾已加強了貝魯特的防禦並選擇獨立於謝哈布行事，宣稱他只承認蘇丹對該鎮的權威。奧爾洛夫承諾的艦隊由米哈伊爾·加夫里洛維奇·科朱霍夫上校指揮[23]，於 6 月抵達阿克。聽聞阿里的死訊後，科朱霍夫同意與查希爾簽訂一份「友好條約」。[24]

第二職業

[編輯]

7 月，科朱霍夫率領他的艦隊（至少有 222 門火炮）出現在貝魯特海岸附近 6號，搭載1200名阿爾巴尼亞僱傭兵和機動炮兵部隊。當大馬士革帕夏拒絕向希哈布提供對抗賈扎爾的援助時，查希爾已經與希哈布達成了結盟協議。在隨後長達一個月的談判中，德魯茲埃米爾成功通過查希爾和他的叔叔阿米爾·穆薩·曼蘇爾說服科朱霍夫將貝魯特交給他。希哈布將繳納30萬基爾什的貢金，並將該鎮置於俄羅斯的保護之下。科朱霍夫則承諾，他的軍隊不會像 1772 年的俄國佔領者那樣掠奪該鎮。雙方同意，俄羅斯將扣留曼蘇爾作為人質，直到謝哈布全額付款。[25]

戰鬥序列

當科朱霍夫的艦隊抵達貝魯特時，其艦隊由下列艦隻組成:[26]

船 類型 槍支
納德日達（科祖霍夫） 護衛艦 三十二
Sv。帕維爾 護衛艦 二十六
Sv。尼古拉 護衛艦 二十六
納克西亞 護衛艦 22
斯拉瓦 護衛艦 16
Sv。阿列克西 波拉卡 20
Sv。安娜 波拉卡 20
Sv。葉卡捷琳娜 波拉卡 18
斯尼克斯 波拉卡 12
扎比亞卡 大篷車 18
六艘半帆船
Second bombardment of Beirut
日期2 August 1773 – 10 October 1773
地點
Beirut
結果 Occupation of the town until late January or early February 1774
參戰方
Imperial Russian Navy
Shihab's forces
Zahir's forces		 Jazzar's garrison

轟炸開始於八月 2日，轟炸持續了一整天，摧毀了港口區域及其塔樓。[27] 據該市的法國領事稱，噪音非常大，甚至距離約 25 英里（40 公里）的西頓都能聽到。阿拉伯消息來源稱，甚至在大馬士革都能聽到這聲音。[28]貝魯特大部分地區被毀，但賈扎爾拒絕投降。科朱霍夫命令部隊和炮兵登陸並發動地面攻擊。城牆多處被攻破，但希哈布拒絕派遣軍隊進攻該鎮，理由是協議規定科朱霍夫必須將該鎮交給德魯茲人，並支付報酬。科朱霍夫選擇維持海陸封鎖，切斷該鎮的糧食供應。[29] 希哈布和扎希爾的軍隊擊潰了由的黎波里帕夏指揮的從貝卡進軍的奧斯曼救援軍。[28]

賈扎爾於九月底開始與襲擊者進行談判。由於擔心向謝哈布或科朱霍夫投降最終會導致自己被處決，他提出向扎希爾投降，並在他的指揮下服役。[30] 賈扎爾於十月投降貝魯特 10日,[26]他率領800名馬格里布駐軍前往阿卡。[31] 到進攻結束時，俄軍共有 34 人陣亡，96 人受傷。根據他與謝哈布的安排，科朱霍夫在停靠後只奪取了兩艘半帆船和一些武器。當後者無法向俄羅斯人支付承諾的全部金額時，科朱霍夫威脅要殺死他的德魯茲人質曼蘇爾。希哈佈設法支付了部分款項，科朱霍夫接受了，但需支付餘額。俄國指揮官和他的艦隊啟程前往愛琴海，留下 300 名阿爾巴尼亞僱傭兵看守被軟禁的曼蘇爾，並以佔領者的身份留在城裏。[32]

阿爾巴尼亞人佔領貝魯特直到 1774 年 1 月底或 2 月初,[32] 但尚不清楚他們是否收到了應付的餘額。[n 4] 根據來自西頓的法國領事館的報告，佔領者在貝魯特上空懸掛着俄羅斯國旗，並在該城正門上懸掛了葉卡捷琳娜大帝的巨幅畫像，迫使遊客向其致敬。[29]

後果和遺產

[編輯]
1788 年印刷的《群島地圖集》中的貝魯特地圖

貝魯特投降後不久，賈扎爾和他的馬格里布僱傭兵就從查希爾的營地叛逃到奧斯曼帝國。[31] 隨着 1774 年初俄國人的撤離以及同年《庫楚克開納爾卡條約》的簽署，查希爾不得不獨自面對土耳其政府的報復。俄土和平條約允許俄羅斯在地中海的任何地方設立領事館，開闢與中東的貿易路線，並保障聖地基督教朝聖者的安全，但並未提及查希爾或俄羅斯在戰時在該地區獲得的領土。[33]1775 年 8 月，查希爾在由埃及的阿布·扎哈卜率領的奧斯曼軍隊圍攻阿克里期間被殺。由於希哈布從未直接反抗奧斯曼帝國，他很快就得到了奧斯曼帝國的赦免。但由於賈扎爾 (Jazzar) 的重稅，他於 1776 年被迫放棄貝魯特。賈扎爾當時剛被奧斯曼帝國政府任命為西頓帕夏。[34]

這是阿拉伯城市首次受到俄羅斯統治，也是自兩個半世紀前奧斯曼帝國征服該地區以來，貝魯特首次脫離奧斯曼帝國的控制。[35] 1773 年，「Place des Canons」（「大炮廣場」）成為如今貝魯特中心區烈士廣場的通用名稱。儘管是非官方的，但這個名字一直使用到 20 世紀 50 年代。它指的是俄羅斯人在廣場上部署的大型火炮，當時廣場是城牆東邊的一片空地，被稱為 Bourj。[36]

這項短暫的佔領的重要性仍然是對其進行分析的相對較少的歷史學家和學者爭論的話題。威廉·珀森 (William Persen) 在 1952 年對這一事件的評估中，淡化了佔領的重要性，只是將其描述為「西方滲透中東的新力量」。[35] 另一方面，P·珀米諾夫 (P. Perminov) 等蘇聯學者則將其描述為現代冷戰時期蘇聯向第三世界國家民族解放運動提供援助的早期表現。[35]

筆記

[編輯]
  1. ^ Çeşme is sometimes spelled "Chesma" or "Chesme".
  2. ^ By the time Yaqub reached Paros, Orlov had been gone for four days on a mission to Livorno. Spiridov, who had been in charge there, told Ali's envoy that he was not at liberty to form an alliance. Yaqub then sailed to Livorno, where he met Orlov, after which he travelled all the way to Saint Petersburg to pass the message to Catherine herself.[12]
  3. ^ According to Lusignan, a certain Amir Mahamut was appointed by the Greek captain Anton Psaro, as governor of Beirut, in response to calls by members of the local Greek Orthodox community for greater protection in the face of their Druze overlords. Lusignan, however, also designates April as the month in which the events take place, contradicting other accounts of this occupation.[17]
  4. ^ Some Arab chroniclers, such as Tannus al-Shidyaq, wrote that the Russians were fully repaid. On the other hand, Paul Masson, author of Histoire du commerce français dans le Levant au XVIIIe siècle, wrote that "100 purses" were never paid.[29]

參考

[編輯]
  1. ^ 1.0 1.1 Persen 1955，第276頁.
  2. ^ Sicker 2001，第69–70頁.
  3. ^ Gallant 2015，第18頁.
  4. ^ Persen 1955，第277–278頁; Smilianskaya, Velizhev & Smilianskaya 2011，第346–347頁
  5. ^ Anderson 1952，第278頁.
  6. ^ Anderson 1952，第282頁; Gallant 2015，第18–19頁.
  7. ^ Persen 1955，第276頁; Anderson 1952，第291頁.
  8. ^ Smilianskaya, Velizhev & Smilianskaya 2011，第333–334頁.
  9. ^ Smilianskaya, Velizhev & Smilianskaya 2011，第334–336頁.
  10. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第131–132頁; Persen 1955，第278頁.
  11. ^ Persen 1955，第279頁.
  12. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第132頁.
  13. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第133頁.
  14. ^ Persen 1955，第279–280頁; Anderson 1952，第298頁.
  15. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第133–134頁; Persen 1955，第280頁.
  16. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第133–134頁; Anderson 1952，第298頁.
  17. ^ Persen 1955，第280頁.
  18. ^ Persen 1955，第280–281頁.
  19. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第135頁.
  20. ^ 20.0 20.1 20.2 Persen 1955，第281頁.
  21. ^ Mariti 1774，第121頁.
  22. ^ Persen 1955，第281頁; Anderson 1952，第300頁.
  23. ^ Solov'ev 1991，第102, endnote at p. 287頁
  24. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第135–136頁.
  25. ^ Persen 1955，第281–282頁; Harris & Harris 2014，第122頁.
  26. ^ 26.0 26.1 Anderson 1952，第302頁.
  27. ^ Persen 1955，第282–283頁.
  28. ^ 28.0 28.1 du Quenoy 2014，第136頁.
  29. ^ 29.0 29.1 29.2 Persen 1955，第283頁.
  30. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第136–137頁.
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 Philipp 2001，第138頁.
  32. ^ 32.0 32.1 du Quenoy 2014，第137頁.
  33. ^ Persen 1955，第283–284頁; du Quenoy 2014，第139頁.
  34. ^ du Quenoy 2014，第138頁; Philipp 2001，第43–44頁.
  35. ^ 35.0 35.1 35.2 du Quenoy 2014，第129頁.
  36. ^ Khalaf 2013，paragraph starting "The first definitive change in its public identity ..."; du Quenoy 2014，第137頁.

來源

[編輯]

進一步閱讀

[編輯]
取自 "https://wiki.gdrain.workers.dev/w/index.php?title=User:Hnlyyyy/沙盒&oldid=85329936"